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REBECCA TYRE l't aI., Apprllants, v. AETNA LIFE
INSURANCE C01'11' AXY
Corporation), Respondent.

ea

[1] Husband and Wife-Community Property-Insurance Policies.
-An insurnnre policy on the husband's life is community
property when the prrlllimns have been paid with community
funds.
[2] Id.-Community Property-Disposition-Voluntary Transfer
as Voidable.-A surviving wife Cllllnot avoid a contract entered
into for 11 valuable consideration by her husband in the course
of his lifetime management of the cOlllmunity personalty,
though it was made without her consent and temporarily
affected her control immediately following his death.
[3] Id.-Community Property-Management and Control-Insurance Policies.-A husband's election to have the proceeds of
his insurance policy paid as an annuity instead of in a lump
sum was not an exercise of his nontestamentary power of manI1gement of community property during his lifetime, but I1n
attempt to dispose of proceeds after his death. Until he died
he could elect to have the proeecds paid as a lump sum or as an
annuity aetuarially worth that sum.
[4] Insurance-Proceeds-Method of Payment.-As between an insured husband and the insurer there was consideration for a
change in method of payment where the husband elected to
have the proceeds of his life policy paid as nn annuity instead
of in a lump sum. The right to an nnnuity was consideration
for surrender of the right to a lump sum payment.
[5] Id.-Beneficiaries-Change of Beneficiary.-There is consideration between nn insurer and the insured when the insured
changes the beneficiary from one person to another.
[6] Husband and Wife-Oommunity Property-Disposition-Voluntary Transfer as Voidable.-Though nn insurance contract
provides that the insured husband has the right to change
the beneficiary without the wife's consent when she is namcd
[1] A pplication of comulUnity property system to problems
arising in cOllnection with life insurance policies, notes, 114 A.L.R.
545; 168 A.L.R. 342. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Community Property,
§§ 28, 34; Am.Jur., COllllllunity Property, § 3;).
[2] Sce Cal.Jur.2d, COllllllunity Property, § 72.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Husband und Wife, § 56; [2, 6, 12,
13, 15] HIl~band and Wife, § 103(;) ; [3] Husbnnd and Wife, § 100;
[4, 7] Insurance, § 219; (5) Insurance, § 225; [8-10] Husband and
Wife, § 1-10: [11) Appeal nntI gnur, § 119; [14] Insurance, § 220.
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as such, any such ('hange of bencficiary without her consent anti
without a valuable consideration other than substitution of
beneficilll'ies is voidable, and after the husband's death the
wife may maintain an action for her community share in the
proceeds of the policy.
[7] Insul'ance-Proceeds and Beneficiaries.-Although payment of
life insurance proceeds is a matter of contract between the
insured and the insurer, the immred's exereifle of his unilateral
right under the contract to select the beneficiary is testamentary
in character, a!'l is the exercise of his unilateral right under
the policy to determine whether the proceeds shall be paid as
a lump sum or in the form of an annuity.
[8) Husband and Wife-Testamentary Disposition of Community
Property.-Under Prob. Code, § 201, giving the husband testamentary coutrol over only half the community property, the
word "testamentary" is not limited to formal testaments.
[9] Id.-Testamentary Disposition of Community Property.-AIthough a wife· can set aside a husband's unauthorized gift of
cOlllmunity property in its entirety during his lifetime, sh('
is limited to recovery of her half share after his death on
the theory that his testamentary powers validate the gift of
his half interest.
[10] Id.-Testamentary Disposition of Community Property.-Just
as the husband cannot deprive his wife of her community interest by exceeding his testamentary powers to make gifts of
more than half the cOlllIllunity property to third persons, so he
cannot defeat her interest by making. a testamentary gift to
her under conditions that restrict her management and control
of the property. Her remedy in both situations is to disavow
the gift and stand on her community rights.
[11] Appeal-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Case.-Where
the facts are not disputed, an issue merely raising a new
question of law may be considered for the first time by the
Supreme Court on appeal.
[12] Husband and Wife-Community Property-Disposition-Voluntary Transfer as Voidable.-When a husband attempts to
dispose of his wife's share of the community property as well
as his own, naming her as one of the takers, she must elect
between her community rights and her husband's I("ift. If she
accepts the gift, she must relinquish all inCl})lsistent claims.
[1Sa, 1Sb] Id. - Community Property - Disposition - Voluntary
Tra.nsfer as Voidable.-Where a wife was the sole primary
beneficiary under her husband's life policy in which he exercised his ullilutel"Ul right to change the method of payment by
providing thnt the proceeds should be paid as an annuity
instead of in a lump sum, the wife sufficiently elected to stand
on her eOllimullity rights, thoug-h she prayed for half the fllce
of the policy in c:\lIh anti the other half according- to her hus-
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band's plan j but by so electing she di:;qualified herself as th!'
beneficiary of her husband's gift. though such disqualification
did not remove her life as tIll' IIll'aSUrement for the annuity
payable to the husband's donees.
[14] Insurance - Proceeds - Persons Entitled. - If the primary
bcnl'fieiary of a life insurance policy disqualifies himself, the
proeel'ds are payable to the altl'rnate beneficiary, not to the
insured's estate though the alternate beneficiary's interest was
conditioned on surviving the primary beneficiary as well as
the insured.
[15] Husband and Wife-Community Property-Disposition-Voluntary Transfer as Voidable.-Undl'r a life insurance policy
making thc insured's wife the sole primary beneficiary and
providing that the proceeds should be paid as an annuity instead of a lump sum, until the wife notified the insurer of
her election to stand on her comlllunity property rights, the
insurer was authorized to make payments in accordance with
the terms of the policy, but the date she first demanded the
payment of her cOIllmunity property interest in cash marked
the commencement of her right to sbtutory interest on her recovery of her cOllllllunity property interest in the proceeds of
the policy.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. l\IcIntyre Faries, Judge, Reversed with
directions.
Action to recover widow's eommunity property interest ill
the proeeeds of a life insuranee policy. Judgment for defcnuant reversed with direetions.
'Vise man & Elmore and Aaron Elmore for Appellants.
"William K. Young, Herman F. Selvin and Chapman,
Frazer, Lindley & Young for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs, the widow and three adult
daughters of the insured, appeal from a judgment for rlefendant ill an aetion to recover the widow's community properly
interest ill the proeeeds of a life insurance policy.
'l'he fads are not in dispute. Rebeeea Tyre (hereafter call('d
plaintiff) and Louis Tyre, the insured, wcre married in Los
AngPles in 1917 and lived there as hushanu and wife until
Mr. TYl'e's death in 1957. Def('IH1aut issued its polil'~' ill
the faee amount of $20,000 upon the lift' of tlw insul'('d ill
1926. All the pr(,lllilllllS \\"('J'(' pail1 frolll \'OIllIllUllity fuuds.

'1'\,I~I': ,'. AETNA I,WE

11'''' CO.

'fhe original belll'ill'iary was the 'fyre Brothers Glass COIllpany. ljPOll the immrcII's l'l'tircmcnt ft'om the bnsilH'ss ill
1946, he elianl!t'd thl' benefit·jar.\, of the poli('~v to make it payable to plaintiff ill a lump sum. In 1950 the insured exercised
his option under the policy of selecting an alternate sl'ttlement. He directed that npon his (}Path plaintiff receive an
annuity based on her life expectancy at that time. If she
failcd to survive him by 10 years, the monthly pa;nnents werc
to be divided among the three daughters for the balanee of
the 10-year period only. .As so amended the policy continued
in force for the remaindf'l' of the insured's life and was in
effect at his death.
Plaintiff was 59 years and 8 months of age at the time her
husband died. An average person of that age has a life expectancy, established by standard mortality tables, of 14
years. Under the terms of her husband's choice of settlement,
plaintiff will receiw $20,664 in installments of $123 per mouth
if she lives out her full expectancy. If she fails to sUl'Yive the
10-year period, defendant '8 total liability will be $14,760.
To receive $10,000, plaintiff must survive 6.77 years. Plaintiff has suffered three heart attacks and the trial court found
that her life expectancy may be less than that of an average
person of her age.
The insured changed the method of payment without plaintiff's knowledge or approval. Since the policy had been in
the possession of a bank as collateral security for a loan, plaintiff did not learn of the change until a few months after her
husband's death. She promptly disavowed his choice and
requested payment of the face amount of the ol'i:!innl po1i~y
in cash. Defendant refused to alter the method of settlement.
Plaintiff and her daughters thf'reupol1 brought this action
praying for $10,000 in cash representing plaintiff's community
interest and a declaration that the remaining $10,000 be paid
according to the influred's flelection at $61.50 per month.
Defendant eOlltends that it is not obligated to pay any sum
under the policy except $123 per month for plaintiff's life
or 10 years, whichever is longer.
[1] A policy of insurance on the husband's life is community property when the premiums have been paid with community funds. (N CIO Yorlc Life rll.~. Co. v. Bank 0/ Italy, 60
Cal.App. 602, 606 [214 P. 61] ; Blethen v. Pacific Milt. Life
Ins. Co., 198 Cal. 91, 99 [243 P. 431] ; (Jrilltnt v. (irimm, 26
Ca1.2d 173, 175 [157 P.2d 841].) During the existel1ce of the
marriage the respective interests of the hnshand amI wifc in
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l'ommUIl ity property lH'C lWt'SPllt, <'xist iug', alltl <''1uai (Civ.
Codt" § 1Gl a), but "the husban,\ has the munag'rlllPnt alltl
control of the community lll'rSonai pl'Opl'rty, with lil,c ab8011ltr
powcr of disposition, other than testamelltary, as he has of
his srparate estate; proyi,Ied, however, that he cannot make
a gift of sueh eOllllllunity personal property, or dispose of
the sallle without a valuable considemtion, . . . without tlll'
written ('onsent of the wife." (Civ. Code, § 172.) \Vhell the
community is dissolved by death, "one-half of the cOllunullity
prop<'rty bL'longs to the surviving spouse; the other half is
subject to the testamentary disposition of the decedent."
_ (Prob. Code, § 201.) Both parties rely 011 these sections.
Plaintiff contends that she became entitled, immediately upon
hcr husband's death, to oue-half of each part of the eOlllmunity
property. DL'fendant contends that the insured had power
to enter into thc r;upplelllcntal cOlltl'aet by virtue of his general powers of management and control and that plaintiff
cannot disavow his contract.
[2] Plaintiff could not avoid a contract entered into for
a valuable consideration by her husband ill the course of
his lifetime management of the community personalty even
though it was made without her consent allu t<>mporarily
affected her control immediately following hi,; death. Thus,
in Beemer v. Rohc/', 137 Cal.App. 293 [30 P.2d 5471 (see also
Beem.er v; Rake?', 137 Cn1.App. 298 l30 P.2d 549]), the husband invested community funds in a saving,; and loan "accumulative investment certificate." The wife sought immediate recovery of the entire sum and the trial court ordered
payment" forthwith." On appeal the court awarded the wife
her one-half commuuity interest in the sums evideneed by the
certificate, but held that she was not entitled to immediate
payment beeause her right to recover poss<'ssion was sub.iect
to the same statutory provisions and writt<'u agreements that
would have governed the husband in withdrawing the funds .
.A relevant statute provided that holdt'rs of e('rtifieates in
savings and loan institntions, including accumulative investment certifieates, might not be permitted to withdraw moneys
without fi['st having' given a notice of intention to withdraw
not less than 30 days nor more than six months previously.
(Stats. 193], ch. 269, §§ 5.0](c), 6.01.) The hushand ent<>rl'tl
into the investn1<'nt in thc normal course of hi,; lifetime mauagement of thc community personalty. Under the terms of
his invesil1lf'lIt, the wifc',; manag<'Illf'lIt and control of Ilt'J'
share or tlw cOllllllunity Pl'OPl'I·ty at h('[' hushand's tlt'ath
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coulll have been post po ned at most for six months. Anothcr
type of Ii ret iIlle i livest men t that m igh t temporarily illlpedt~
distribution of the wife's cOllllllunity property interest is a
partnership or family corporation arrangement providing
for a windillg up period or an option in the surviving members
to buyout the community interest. (See Wood v. Gunther,
89 Cal.App.2d 718 [201 P.2d 874].)
[3] In the present case, however, the husband's election
to have the policy proceetIs paid as an annuity instead of ill
a lump sum was 110t an exercise of his nontestamentary power
of management during his lifetime, but an attempt to dispose
of proceeds after his death. Uutil he died he could elect to
have the proceeds paid as a lump sum or as an annuity actuarially "'orth that sum. [ 4] Of course, as between the
husband and defendant there was consitIeration for the change
in method of payment. The right to an annuity was consideration for the surrender of the right to a lump stun payment.
[5] Similarly there is consideration between the insurance
company and the insured when the insured changes the beneficiary from one person to another. [6] Nevertheless, it is
settled that even though the insurance contract provides that
the insured husband has the right to change the beneficiary
without the wife's consent when she is named as such, any
such change of beneficiary without her consent and without
a valuable consideration other than substitution of bcneficiaries
is voidable, anti after the death of the husband the wife may
maintain an action for her community share in the proceeds
of the policy. (Grimm v. Grimm, supra; Blethen v. Pacific
Milt. Life Ins. Co., supra, at p. 101; New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Bank of Italy, supra, at p. 607; Beemer v. Roher, 137 Cal.
App. 293, 296-297 [30 P.2d 547] ; McBride v. McBride, 11
Cal.App.2d 521, 523-524 [54 P.2d 480] ; Mundt v. Connecticut
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 35 Cal.App.2d 416, 421 [95 P.2d 966] ; see
Spreckels v. Spreckels, 172 Cal. 775, 784-785 [158 P. 537].)
[7] These cases recognize that although the payment of
insurance proceeds is a matter of contract between the insured
and the insurer, the insured's exercise of his unilateral right
under the contract to seleet the brneficiary is testamentary in
character. Similarly, the insured's exereise of his unilateral
right under the terms of the policy to drtermine whether the
proceeds !;hall be paid as a lump sum or in the form of an
annuity is tpstamcntary in ('haraetrr. [8] Section 201
of the Probate Code gives the hu!;band testamentary control
over only olw-half of the ('Ollllllllllity }ll'oprl'ty, and the wor(]
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"testamentary" as used in that section is not limited to formal
testaments. [9] Thus, although a wife can set aside a
husband's unauthoriz('u gift of community property in its
entirety during his lifetimc (Britton v. Hammell, 4 Ca1.2d
690, 692 [52 P.2d 2211), she is limited to the recovery of her
on<'-hal£ share after his death on the theory that his testamentary powers validate the gift of his half interest. (Britton
v. lIammell, supra; Lahalley v. Lahallc,II. 208 Cal. 323 [281
P. 67], concurring opinion at p. 329; notl" 24 Cal.L.Rev. 306.)
Similarly, a wife's gift causa mortis of community property
(Odone v. 1IIar:occhi, 34 Ca1.2d 431, 439 [211 P.2d 297, 212
P.2d 233,17 A.L.R.2d 1109]) and a husband's gift of a community life insurance poliq (JIaz1I!all v. Brown, 12 CaLApp.
2d 272, 274 [55 P.2d 539]) have been uplll'hi as to the spouse's
community int('rest h,v r('fer('nce to the t('stamentary power.
[ 10] Just as the husband cannot deprive his wife of her
community interest by exceeding his testamentary powers to
make gifts of more than half the eommunity property to third
persons, so he cannot defeat her interest by making a testamentary gift to her under conditions that restrict her management and control of the property. Her remedy in both
situations is to disavow the gift and stand on her community
rights.
Defendant contends, however, that plaintiff has chosen to
accept her husband's gift of his one-half interest in the policy
according to its terms and that she has thercby lost the power
to set the policy aside as to her community interest. [11] Defendant has bcen permitted to raise this issue for the first time
in this court because the facts are not disput<>d and the issue
merely raises a new question of law. (Burdette v. Rolle/SOil
Construction Co., 52 Ca1.2d 720, 725-726 [344 P.2d 307] and
cases cited.)
[12] Wh('n the husband attempts to disposc of his wife's
share of the community property liS w('l1 as his own, naming
her as one of the takers, she must ('1eet between 11<>r community
rights and her husband's gift. (Estate of Wolf(" 48 Ca1.2d
570, 574-575 [311 P.2d 4761 ; Estate of Jloore, 62 Cal.App.
265,270-272 [216 P. 981] ; E.~tate of Ettlinger, 73 Cal.App.2d
967,970 [167 P.2<1 7381.) If she accepts thc gift, she must
relinquish all inconsistent claims. (Lauricella v. Lau1'icella,
161 Cal. 61, 69 [118 P. 430} ; Ma:mall v. Broum, 12 Cal.App.2d.
272,275-276 [55 P.2(1 5:191.) [13a] Under these cases an
election is required herc. Plaintiff has elcct<>d to stand 011
her community rights even though she prays for 11alf the
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cOllllllunity assrts uSNl to pUl'chase the anlluity in cash aud
till' Othl'l' haH aCl'ortiing' to her hushand's plan. Plaintiff is
the sole primary benl'fieiary under the policy. Only in the
event that she fails to survive her husband by 10 years will
the altl'mate brueficiaries have any claim to the proeeeds.
l\IoreoYer, the alternate beneficiaries haye joined in the prayer.
III this situation, unlike the Lauricdla and Mazman eases
where the wife was only a partial beneficiary and the other
beneficiaries asserted adverse interests, plaintiff sufficiently
indicated her election by demanding her statutory share in
cash and requesting her husband's share under his plan.
Although plaintiff has not lost her right to set aside her
husband's unauthorized disposition of her community interest,
she is nevertheless not entitled to ree.eive his share under the
terms of the policy. By electing to stand on her community
rights, plaintiff has disqualified herself as the beneficiary of
her husband's gift. [ 14] If the primary beneficiary of a
life insurance policy disqualifies himself, the proceeds are
payable to the alternate beneficiary and not to the insured's
estate even though the alternate beneficiary's interest was couditioned upon surviving the primary beneficiary as well as
the insured. (Beck v. West Ooast Life Ins. 00.,38 Ca1.2d 643,
646-647 [241 P.2d 544, 26· A.L.R.2d 979].) The husband's
share of the policy therefore became payable to the three
daughters upon plaintiff's disqualification as primary beneficiary.
[ 13b] Defendant contends that e,'en if plaintiff is entitled to her share in a lump sum, the daughters should receive
the monthly payments only for the 10-year period that measures the company's minimum liability under the policy.
Plaintiff's disqualification as the primary beneficiary, however,
dors not remoye her life as the measurement for the annuity;
othrrwise, the husband's donees may be deprived of the benefit
of hi"s investment.
[15] Plaintiff seeks statutory interest on her recovery
commencing 30 days after the date of her husband's death.
(Civ. Code, § 3287.) Until she notified the eompauy of her
election to stand 011 her community property rights, however,
the company was authorized to make payments iu accordance
with the terms of the polil·Y. (Blethcnv. Pacific 1I[/(t.' Life
Ins. Co., HI8 Cal. 91, 101-102 [243 P. 431] ; Ins. Code, § 10172.)
'fhc record docs not disclose the datc upon which plailltiIT
first demanded the payment of her community property
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interest in rash. That date prop('rl~' llHtl'l,S tltl' eOJlllllencenH'llt
of intcrest.
The judgment is rc\'(>rsed and the trial eourt is ordered
to enter judgment in acconlallce with thc views exprcssed
herein.
Gillson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, Dissellting.-Tll my view the opinion prepared
for the District Court of Appeal by Justice Herndon and
concurred in by Presiding Justice Pox and Justice Ashburn
(reported in (Cal.App.) 1 Cal.Uptr. 563) adequately discusscs and corrcctly resoh'es the qil€'stions pre::;ented 011 this
appeal. For the rcasons th<.'rein stated I would affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
McComb, J., concurred.
Respondent 's l~titioll for a rl'll<.'aring was denied July 27,
1960. Sehauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opiuioll that
the petition should be granted.
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